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Abstract
The normative structure of the international system is changing, driven by the logics of effectiveness and appropriateness.
Whereas the balance between democracy and autocracy had clearly favored the former, this appears to no longer be the
case. Not only are authoritarian methods spreading because they have been found to be successful, but democracy’s very
legitimacy has been eroded from self-doubt and as a consequence of rising and increasingly confident authoritarian great
powers. This commentary provides an overview of these trends.
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1. Introduction
The international system is currently going through a pro-
found transition. The balance between democracy and
autocracy, which seemed tilted so far to the former’s ad-
vantage during the 1990s and the mid-2000s, appears to
be leveling out, with ever more assertive authoritarian
states and an increasingly embattled democratic world.
One only need look at the headlines.
In March 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean penin-
sula from Ukraine in a clear act of aggression, violating
one of the most sacred post-Second World War Euro-
pean norms prohibiting territorial aggrandizement. Al-
though few countries recognized its legality, nearly ev-
eryone has adjusted to this new reality. Russia has also
fueled a civil war in eastern Ukraine, which brought sanc-
tions, but little else. 18 months later, Russia intervened
militarily in Syria, representing the first time since the
end of the Cold War that a great power used force out-
side of its immediate neighborhood in defiance of Amer-
ican wishes. Russia is now seen as a player in the Mid-
dle East, a region fromwhich it largely had been expelled
decades before.
An expanding China is seizing islands in the South
China Sea, hundreds ofmiles away from itsmainland and
in the territorial seas of several Asian countries. The Per-
manent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling against these
moves was shrugged off by Beijing as barely a distraction.
In the summer of 2017, China’s first, official overseasmili-
tary base was opened in Djibouti, marking China’s expan-
sion into the Middle East and Africa. This solidifies the
fact that China is now more than just a regional actor
and imbues that country with the trappings of the rising
power of the future.
Even in the democratic West, there are mounting
questions about the strength of liberal norms as pop-
ulism continues to spread at the ballot box. Certain
countries once thought to be the paragons of a post-
communist transition, such as Hungary and Poland, have
seemingly copied from the playbook which had previ-
ously led to the creation of authoritarian regimes in Be-
larus and Russia. Moreover, Turkey, a NATO member
and perennial European Union hopeful, continued its
steady shift from democracy to autocracy—a process
which seems both unstoppable and, by now, all too fa-
miliar. Freedom House’s 2011 Freedom in the World re-
port (FreedomHouse, 2011) was entitled The Authoritar-
ian Challenge to Democracy. It was updated in 2018 as
Democracy in Crisis (Freedom House, 2018). A new ideo-
logical normal appears to be descending on the world.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 120–123 120
The swan songof democracy’s recent dominancewas
likely the Color Revolutions. While they were initially
successful, they taught autocrats valuable lessons which
forestalled what some believed would be the beginning
of a “fourth wave” of democracy. The so-called Arab
Spring of 2011 rapidly turned into an Arab Winter, with
regimes either descending into chaos or strengthening
their dictatorships. Only Tunisia benefitted from this op-
timistic, but ultimately premature, moniker.
The norms that operate within the international sys-
tem cannot help but be affected by this upsurge of au-
thoritarianism. This wider environment fosters the cre-
ation of new norms, weakens or strengthens those that
already exist in line with these changes, and facilitates
their spread from one country to another. New policies
at the domestic level are inevitable as the context within
which policies are made has now changed.
This process is driven by two logics: effectiveness and
appropriateness (Ambrosio, 2010). The former makes it
more likely that norms and the policies shaped by them
will be adopted because they appear to be successful.
The current autocratic moment was initially driven by
this logic. As authoritarian regimes learned lessons from
the successes and failures of others, they developed a
collection of policies and institutional changes to make
them better able to resist democratic pressures at home
and from abroad. This has become alternatively called
“political technology” (Wilson, 2005), an “authoritarian
toolkit” (Diamond, Plattner, &Walker, 2016), or a “menu
of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002). Through the logic of
effectiveness, items in this tried and tested list were
copied by others with the purpose of eroding democracy
and strengthening dictatorship. There is no single origin
of this methodology, but the “Putin model” is perhaps
the most prominent variety within the European con-
text and includes several steps such as weakening the ju-
diciary, undermining nongovernment organizations and
civil society, centralizing power, controlling the media,
manipulating the electoral process, and selective repres-
sion. All of this serves to create a façade of democracy.
We can see its influence even in countries once thought
to be consolidated democracies, such as Fidesz’s system-
atic attack on checks and balances in the Hungarian po-
litical system. Although not always successful, as Vik-
tor Yanukovych found to his misfortune in Ukraine, this
blueprint became ubiquitous for the simple reason that
it works.
We now appear to be entering a new stage of the
global normative structure where the logic of appropri-
ateness increasingly applies. This logic rests, not upon
the success of norms or policies, but upon their very le-
gitimacy. According to the diffusion literature, this is the
difference between learning (effectiveness) and emula-
tion (appropriateness). In cases of emulation, the nor-
mative environment creates pressures to conform to a
course of action because it is seen as right and proper.
Deviation from this is constrained by the need “to sig-
nal…commitment to global norms” (Simmons, Dobbin, &
Garrett, 2006, p. 799). When the legitimacy of the old
norms weaken, it is easier to violate them and to adopt
new ones.
One can see how this once worked in democracy’s
favor. Within post-communist Europe, communism was
not only proven to be a failure, but democracy came
to be seen as the only legitimate form of government
in the region. Globally, a unipolar international system
centered on a norm-proselytizing United States engen-
dered conditions which led McFaul (2010) to title an arti-
cle “Democracy Promotion as aWorld Value”. The “Asian
values” resistance to liberalism during the 1990s never
achieved enough normative legitimacy to substantively
erode the propriety of democracy. Even Putin framed his
power grab in terms of democracy—“sovereign democ-
racy,” granted, but democracy nonetheless. Although lib-
eral democracy was never truly the only game in town, a
key factor maintaining the global balance in its favor was
the widespread belief in democracy’s dominant claim to
legitimacy. The fact that autocratic regimes paid lip ser-
vice to the forms of democracy was indicative of its nor-
mative power.
As the global legitimacy of democracy appears to be
eroding, it is quite possible that a sea change is either cur-
rently happening or is on the horizon. If we regard of this
as a normative tug-of-war between democracy and au-
thoritarian, then as one weakens, the other strengthens.
Part of this is due to the internal situation within
the democratic West which currently expresses itself
through the outpouring of populist sentiments. Exam-
ples abound. Consider just the following: the rise of pop-
ulist parties throughout Europe, including and the Alter-
native for Deutschland, and their electoral victories Hun-
gary, Austria, Poland; the Brexit vote, which succeeded
over the objections of all of Britain’s major parties; Don-
ald Trump’s presidency in America; and, the fact that the
center-left and center-right establishment parties are re-
ceiving their lowest vote totals since the Second World
War in countries such as France, Germany, and Italy. To
paraphrase one of the most over-quoted poems in West-
ern civilization, the center, clearly, is not holding. This is
obviously due, to a large extent, to concerns about immi-
gration and the fallout from the Great Recession. How-
ever, it seems far deeper than this. There is a crisis of con-
fidence within the democratic world, not just about the
performance of its institutions, but one which questions
the very foundations of the neoliberal consensus. The
fact that Viktor Orbán (2014), the prime minister of a Eu-
ropean Union member state, can criticize the very foun-
dations of liberal democracy and openly declare that he
supports building an “illiberal state”, citing such countries
as “Singapore, China…Russia, Turkey” as his role models,
is indicative of how dramatically things have changed. If
the democratic West is questioning itself so at such a ba-
sic level, thenwhy shouldn’t others? This cannot but help
to shift things more in favor of authoritarianism.
Within the authoritarian world, autocrats are becom-
ing more confident and their authoritarian policies more
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overt and brazen. Whether this means removing term
limits to that they can potentially rule for life, openly in-
terfering in democratic elections in the West, violently
cracking down on peaceful protestors, or creating a dy-
nasty by grooming their children to govern after they are
gone, themask has clearly slipped and autocrats are now
far less concerned about keeping up the pretenses of
democracy. To put it in terms of emulation, governments
feel far less concerned about deviating from democratic
norms. As such actions become routine, this creates a
normative feedback loop which normalizes authoritari-
anism and reinforces the logic of appropriateness.
That this is occurring even in the absence of pros-
elytizing states is notable. Chinese President Xi Jinping
(2015) said that “we have no intention to interfere in
other countries’ internal affairs, export our own social
system and model of development, or impose our own
will on others”. And there is a lot of truth to this, as
modern-day China is clearly noMaoist regime, seeking to
spread its version of communism. Putin’s Russia, too, is
definitely no Soviet Union, which consistently presented
itself as a role model to the rest of the world. The fact
that neither currently possesses a missionary impulse is
ultimately irrelevant, however. While the respectability
of norms is strengthened by practice, it is also bolstered
by the prestige ofmajor powerswhich “effectively define
international standards of legitimacy, serving as models
for other states” (Fordham & Asal, 2007, p. 32). One
analysis referred to this as “authoritarian gravity centres”
(Kneuer & Demmelhuber, 2016, p. 3). Russia’s increased
standing on the global stage is surpassed only by China’s,
which has emerged as the secondmost powerful country
in the world. Even if there is no intention of advancing an
ideological agenda, these powerful authoritarian states
will inevitably change the nature of the global debate
between democracy and autocracy. As more states go
down this path, this creates a de facto ‘reference group’,
which further makes authoritarianism appear appropri-
ate. One can cite as evidence of this process the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization’s role in legitimizing regional
norms against regime change and effectively fortifying
Central Asian authoritarianism.
In short, the normative structure of the international
system is changing. The democratic world must prepare
itself for a new, new world order in which the balance
between democracy and autocracy no longer clearly fa-
vors itself.
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